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Abstract 
 
Two apparently disparate phenomena of defective body integrity are reviewed. The first 
concerns dysmelia, characterized by the congenital absence or deformation of limbs, and 
the focus of the review is on phantom sensations of people with this kind of physical 
integrity disorder. The second phenomenon consists of non-psychotic individuals’ desire 
to have a healthy limb amputated, which is interpreted as a mismatch between the 
physical integrity of a particular limb and its representation in multimodal cortical areas 
of the brain. We outlined commonalities and differences between the two conditions and 
note the absence, in both areas of research, of a unified theory that would account for the 
reported phenomenology. Phantom limbs in dysmelia and the desire for limb amputation 
most likely are the consequence of very early developmental dissociations between 
physical and phenomenal body shapes. They are mirror images of one another in that the 
former constitutes an “animation without incarnation” and, the latter, an “incarnation 
without animation”. 
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This paper examines two apparently disparate phenomena of corporeal awareness. In 
both, the completeness or integrity of one’s own body is hampered. The first is the 
occurrence of phantom limbs in individuals born with an “incomplete” body, in which the 
physical body is incomplete, but the missing limb seems to be represented in the subject's 
brain, at least as can be inferred from its phenomenal presence. The second phenomenon 
is the strong desire, by non-psychotic and otherwise well-adjusted healthy individuals, to 
have a fully functional limb removed. In this condition, it can be argued that despite the 
physical presence of a limb, the lack of acceptance is due to some underrepresentation in 
the subject's brain. We review the literature on both conditions and propose that phantom 
sensations of physically absent limbs and the request for removal of normally developed 
extremities may be mirror images of one another on the conceptual level: an animation 
without incarnation and an incarnation without animation, respectively. 
 
Animation without incarnation: phantom sensations of congenitally absent limbs 
Dysmelia is a heterogenous condition affecting the physical integrity of the body 
(O’Rahilly 1951; O’Rahilly and Gardner 1975). It involves a deficit in limb formation 
caused by genetic or developmental factors that results in a deformation of arms or legs. 
In cases of a complete absence of skeletal parts the term “amelia” is used. In general, 
limb reduction deficits are the result of an arrest of formation of the embryonic limb buds 
during early fetal development (prior to the 8th week of gestation in the case of amelia) or 
of later vascular, mechanical or teratogenic incidents (see Froster-Iskenius and Baird 
1990 for review). Amelia of one or more limbs occurs with a frequency of 1.5 per 
100’000 live births. While upper and lower limbs are affected comparably often, there is 
a preponderance of left-sided over right-sided defects (unless they are thalidomide-
induced; Lenz 1988). The present review is not primarily concerned with the physical 
aspects of limb reduction defects, but with the observation that a minority of individuals, 
who show such defects, report phantom sensations of the congenitally absent limb 
(henceforth referred to as “congenital phantoms”). 
 
To our knowledge, the physiologist Gabriel Gustav Valentin (1810-1883) was the first to 
systematically question persons with dysmelia about phantoms of their missing limbs 
(Valentin 1836). During both his and more modern times the investigative focus of 
phantom limb research was almost exclusively on phantom limbs after amputation 
(Finger and Hustwit 2003; Halligan 2002). Valentin explored whether phantom 
sensations (he used the term "feelings of integration") were observed in persons born 
with incomplete bodies because he doubted the validity of theories that conceptualized 
such sensations as the brain's "sensorimotor memories" of once owned limbs. 
Specifically, he hoped “to definitely falsify the view that the integration would rely on 
certain memories of sensation” (p 330). He presented case studies of four persons born 
with one incomplete upper limb, who all reported phantom sensations qualitatively 
comparable to those described by amputees. For instance, one nineteen-year-old girl born 
without a left hand (shortened metacarpal bones, but no phalanges) noted the phantom 
presence of a regular palm including all five fingers. Valentin was not satisfied by this 
purely subjective report and tried to “objectify” it by administering several behavioral 
tasks. For instance, he provoked paresthesias in some of the phantom fingers by 
prolonged pressure on certain nerves in the stump. As the pattern of innervation in the 
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fingers could not be known by his subjects, the fact that tingling sensations were elicited 
in the “correct” phantom fingers was taken as evidence for the genuineness of the 
reported phantoms.  
 
Valentin also designed a length estimation task, later re-invented for the same purpose by 
other authors (Weinstein and Sersen 1961). Using the normally developed limb as a 
reference, subjects were required to indicate the length of the phantoms of their missing 
limbs. Repeated measurements allowed a systematic determination of the size and shape 
of reported phantoms. On the basis of these observations, Valentin concluded that ”[the 
integration of sensation] by persons born with limb dysplasia teaches us that it is out of 
the question that they could be accounted for by memory or recollective imagery” 
(Valentin 1836, p. 334). He speculated about the potential mechanisms of phantom 
sensations in the four individuals studied, emphasizing that peripheral and central 
nervous system factors were probably involved. Interestingly, Valentin was quick to 
caution scientists not to accept his speculations as “an axiom, i.e., the beginning of our 
ignorance or the borderlines of our knowledge” (p 334). It turned out that his concerns 
were entirely unjustified. His study was to remain unnoticed for more than a century, and 
it was the axiom he had set out to question (i.e., the view of previous limb use as a 
necessary precondition for phantom sensations) that was about to gain popularity in the 
decades to follow. 
 
A paper by a Czech neurologist, Arnold Pick (1851- 1924), was most influential for the 
preservation of this axiom. In an overview on pathologies of corporeal awareness, Pick 
(1915) emphasized the continuous reconstruction of a central representation of one’s own 
body, the "body schema", during child development. He equated phantom sensations in 
amputees with an activation of these central engravings: the physical part could be lost, 
but its representation would persist. In this context he rather parenthetically mentioned 
the following statement of affairs:  
 
“… the absence of the phantoms discussed here in cases of congenital [aplasia] or after 
amputation experienced during early childhood. The amputated part has simply never 
been represented in the body schema of these particular persons” (p. 260). 
 
 
Although Pick authoritatively labeled this statement a "fact", his text contained no 
reference to his own empirical observations nor to any published data on people with 
congenital limb deficiencies. Only a casual note, Pick’s 1915 publication was quickly 
adopted as the key reference to document the non-existence of phantoms in individuals 
born with absent limbs. Simmel (1956; 1961) later helped to spread Pick’s reference to 
the English language literature, even though she herself had recognized that Pick’s 
statement was not based on observation (Simmel 1966). Still today, the notion of 
phantom limbs occurring exclusively after amputation acquired during adulthood or late 
childhood is widely and unquestionably accepted. We believe that the rarity of the 
condition is responsible for the persistence of this axiom. Furthermore, as dysmelia 
occurs in various types and degrees, the formation of a proposed theory depended 
considerably on the type of limb deficiencies an author had investigated. We critically 
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discuss several hypothetical mechanisms published in the rather scattered 20th century 
literature on congenital phantom limbs (Table 1). 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as the product of wishful thinking and 
suggestibility 
Sohn (1914), apparently unaware of Valentin’s 1836 contribution, reported the case of a 
19-years-old woman born without a left forearm and hand, who complained about painful 
sensations in her missing hand and fingers. He noticed the theoretical significance of this 
observation, but was unwilling to even speculate about any sensory, motor or 
representational mechanisms that could have accounted for the genesis of phantom 
sensations in this case. He preferred to point out that the “only mildly erotic” girl might 
have considered the lack of physical body integrity a barrier to marriage and therefore 
assumed “that the subjective sensation of pain in the fingers and the consciousness of a 
hand are equivalent to a wish fulfillment” (p 961). The notion of wish fulfillment on the 
part of the examiner was considered by Skoyles (1990), who raised concerns about 
general suggestibility effects shaping a patient’s response to questions about phantom 
sensations. These concerns appear especially warranted as they addressed observations in 
children with congenital limb deficiencies (e.g. Poeck 1964; 1969; Simmel 1961; 
Weinstein and Sersen 1961; Weinstein et al. 1964). Skoyles emphasized the high 
vulnerability of child testimony to leading questions and situational demands, including 
the “length estimation game” to obtain measurements of the size and shape of a phantom.  
 
Although we appreciate the recommendation to maintain a critical attitude when 
confronted with spontaneous claims about unusual experiences, or if questioning subjects 
about such experiences, we believe that some measures could have been taken in order to 
substantiate or invalidate an individual’s claim. Valentin’s (1836) selective provocation 
of paresthesias in some, but not other, phantom fingers is one simple, but effective, way 
to “objectify” an individual’s report about phantom fingers. Another way is to ask about 
postural properties of claimed phantom limbs, especially when their characteristic 
physical responses are not immediately accessible to a layperson (Fig. 1). 
 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Also, we note that some published observations do not substantiate of an “explanation” of 
congenital phantoms as a product of wish-fulfillment. For instance, as far as Sohn’s 
(1914) “mildly erotic” girl is concerned, one is tempted to wonder whether a painful 
phantom could ever be the product of wishful thinking. Likewise, the relative over-
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representation of certain phantom parts over others (e.g. the hallux over the calf) can 
hardly be explained by differential psychological needs for the different body parts 
(Weinstein and Sersen 1961). Moreover, gaps in the phenomenal experience of a 
phantom (for instance, the sensation of a thumb and a little finger without any fingers felt 
in between) can “scarcely be considered a fantasy worth its salt” (Weinstein and Sersen 
1961, p. 909; see Ramachandran 1993, for similar arguments). Finally, wishful thinking 
does not need the type of mechanical trigger that often elicits sensations of congenitally 
absent limbs. Thus, superficial injury to the stump induced the first-ever awareness of 
congenital phantoms in three out of the four cases communicated by Saadah and Melzack 
(1994). Similarly, Xue (1986) treated two persons with congenital limb dysplasia with 
acupuncture (for reasons unrelated to their condition). Upon needle insertion in the stump 
region, two young women born with an absent or deformed left hand felt a sudden 
prolongation of the arm that took on the shape of a regular upper limb with a hand and 
five fingers.  
To summarize the early historical development, recasting subjects’ reports of concrete 
sensations into mere fantasies marginalized the phenomenon under investigation. Any 
need to adjust the theory of phantom limbs as the brain’s sensorimotor memories thus 
became superfluous, and indirectly helped the axiom of the “nonexistence of congenital 
phantoms” to survive. 
 
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as motor illusions induced by stump movements 
Simmel (1961), in one of the first group studies on congenital phantom limbs, 
interviewed 27 people with dysplasia of the upper limbs about phantom sensations. Two 
persons reported such sensations, both were 10-year-old girls. While one of them was 
born with a completely absent forearm (no finger rudiments attached to the stump), the 
other was born with an incomplete hand. Specifically, while a “rudimentary thumb [was] 
present with some voluntary motion” (p 469), the fingers were absent. Simmel dismissed 
the former girl’s report about phantom finger sensations as due to the suggestive nature of 
the interview. At the same time, she interpreted the latter girl’s report about finger 
phantoms (mainly of the little finger) as an illusory projection of enhanced thumb 
motility into extracorporeal space: “The kinesthetic stimulation resulting from such 
abnormally great excursion may possibly provide a sufficient condition […] which, under 
the special circumstances here, culminates in the experience of a ‘phantom finger’” (p. 
470). Simmel was probably correct in pointing out that cases of completely absent limbs 
must be investigated separately from cases with rudimentary preservation of distal body 
parts attached to the stump ("intercalary aplasia"). However, she failed to notice that her 
proposal was at variance with Valentin (1836), who had explicitly stated “I have to note 
here that the feelings of integration are more vivid in individuals who lack all peripheral 
parts, e.g. all fingers, than in those that are more completely organized in this regard, i.e. 
who still have a thumb or thumb plus first digit” (p 331). Thus, while Simmel’s proposal 
may have some validity with respect to phantoms in individuals with intercalary aplasia, 
it inevitably fails to account for the congenital phantoms reported by people with 
complete aplasia of an entire limb. 
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Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs derived from a representation of the contralateral 
limb 
Burchard (1965) found indications of phantom sensations in only one out of 17 cases 
examined (two more persons reported having felt the congenitally absent hand during 
their dreams; see also Brugger 2008; Valentin 1836). This individual was a 36-year-old 
woman born with a forearm only 9 cm long and with no hand. She occasionally felt a 
prolongation of the stump, so vivid that she would touch its physical tip to ascertain that 
the felt forearm was only a creation of her mind. Fifteen of Burchard’s patients had 
strictly unilateral limb defects, including the woman with the fleeting phantom percept. 
The author therefore speculated (p 370) that congenital phantoms are mediated by 
information about the existing limb that reached the deafferented cortex from homotopic 
areas of the contralateral hemisphere. This idea was later elaborated on by Grouios 
(1996), who introduced the case of a 12-year-old boy born without a right elbow and 
forearm and reporting phantom sensations of the missing hand and fingers. He argued 
that 
 
"It seems that the upper and lower limbs in people with congenital limb deficiency are 
linked in the brain as a result of frequent co-activation. Hence, sensory input of the left 
upper limb, for example, projects not only to the somatosensory cortex of the right 
cerebral hemisphere but – by identified or unidentified commissural pathways – to 
mirror-symmetrical points in the left cerebral hemisphere. It thus contributes to a weak 
formation of the cortical representation of the right upper limb.” (Grouios 1996, pp 503-
504) 
 
The conceptualization of a congenital phantom as the phenomenal awareness of the 
mirror limb is not without experimental support from the literature on amputation 
phantoms (Jacobson 1931), from reports on referred sensations from a normal to an 
anesthetic hand (Sathian 2000) and from work on the crossmodal integration of 
somesthetic and visual information in limb observation tasks (Funk and Brugger 2008). 
However, the generalization of this theory is limited; clearly, it cannot account for reports 
of congenital phantoms in people with bilateral absence of upper and/or lower limbs. We 
emphasize that the theoretical importance of cases of bilateral limb aplasia was already 
noted in this specific context by Valentin (1836). 
 
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs derived from a schema for hand-mouth 
coordination 
A novel theoretical contribution to the issue of congenital phantoms was provided by 
Gallagher et al. (1998). These authors suggested a very specific mechanism for the 
formation of phantom percepts in individuals with deficient physical body integrity, i.e. 
the activation of an innate schema for hand-mouth coordination. The empirical data on 
which Gallagher et al.’s proposal rests comes from investigations of human fetal 
behavior. Not only are right upper limb preferences already determined at around 10 
weeks of gestation, but the precision of hand-to-mouth movements for thumb sucking, 
from their very first occurrence around week 12 (Hepper et al. 1998; 2005), suggests an 
innate schema representing these movements. Gallagher et al. proposed that evocation of 
this schema stimulating hand and mouth simultaneously could give rise to sensations of a 
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hand even in the physical absence of a hand; specifically, they suggested that activation 
of the mouth part of the schema would always be accompanied by activation of the hand 
part of the schema. "Activation of the expanded face-representing neural map may also 
reactivate the indigenous limb-representing neurons and thus cause the phantom 
experience" (p 59). We note that Gallagher et al. were the first to ground a hypothesis 
that an innate component of body schema is responsible for congenital phantoms on focal 
empirical findings. However, these authors did not address cases of phantoms in persons 
with congenitally absent lower limbs. In fact, their tabular overview of published reports 
on congenital phantoms meticulously and comprehensively lists cases of upper limb 
phantoms (explained by their theory) but omits cases of congenital phantoms of legs and 
feet, even if these had been described by the same original authors. Hence, this theory 
may have its merits, but it clearly cannot account for all observational data from the 
clinical literature on congenital phantoms. 
 
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as manifestations of an innate body schema 
The strongest conclusion from cases of congenital phantoms is that „... a structural basis 
for the phantom experience is encoded in the DNA. We are born with a full-blown 
potential for imaging body parts“(Abramson and Feibel 1981, p 99). In more moderate 
terms, a genetically built-in component for a body schema was described by Melzack 
(1990; Melzack et al. 1997). According to this author, a widespread network of 
thalamocortical and limbic loops (the "neuromatrix") is basically innate, but continuously 
shaped during a person's life by sensory inputs and motor commands. The concept of a 
neuromatrix is not only compatible with reports of phantom sensations of physically not 
developed limbs, but it could also explain phenomena of neural migration and the 
synchronized early development of physically separated brain areas (Melzack 1990). 
However, we would like to add that agreement about the genuineness of congenital 
phantoms does not automatically imply agreement about a genetic basis of corporeal 
awareness. Even if an infant's congenital phantoms could ever be "objectified" a few 
moments after birth, this should not necessarily be taken as evidence for a genetic 
hardwiring of a four-limbed body; "innate" must not be equated with "genetically 
determined". In fact, as pointed out above, the human fetus shows remarkably rich motor 
behavior (e.g., McCartney and Hepper 1999), possibly accompanied by corresponding 
sensory impressions. A central representation of the body could at least theoretically be 
built on this richness of very early intrauterine life, even if the motor commands have not 
emerged from cortical, but spinal, centers. Note that most cases of impaired body 
integrity (i.e. of dysmelia) are not caused by genetic defects, but by unspecified 
"accidents", involving limb amputation, during embryogenesis. We suggest that 
explanations for unequal frequencies of congenital phantoms for upper and lower as well 
as for left and right limbs (Table 2) may ultimately be found in the “laws” governing fetal 
development - such as the slightly earlier development of upper compared to lower limbs 
(O'Rahilly and Gardner 1975) and the differential vascularization of left and right limb 
buds (Bouwes Bavinck and Weaver 1986). With respect to this laterality issue, we note 
the surprisingly low interest by embryologists, teratologists and developmental 
neuroscientist in this issue and plead for a closer collaboration across the different 
medical and psychological disciplines. Fetal determination of congenital phantom limbs 
is also considered in the four-component theory introduced by Price (2006). This 
 8
thoughtful theory offers an alternative to the genetic hardwiring of body form by 
delineating the importance of prenatal and postnatal factors, the incorporation of 
prostheses, and visual factors related to the observation of other people moving their 
limbs. 
 
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as manifestations of the human mirror system 
There is anecdotal evidence for phantom sensations being triggered by the observation of 
other people moving their limbs, both in cases of traumatic amputation (Henderson and 
Smyth 1948) and congenital limb deficiency (Melzack et al. 1997). A woman born 
without arms and legs described how visually observing her sister’s movements could 
evoke feeling these movements as if they were her own: 
 
"Ever since Deb could walk she was taking care of me. I saw her body move from 
childhood's awkwardness to adult gracefulness and strength. But not only did I see this, I 
felt her movements. In a sense, part of her body (the part I lacked on the exterior) was 
mine too..." (Frank 1986, p 191) 
 
Extensive work with a woman born without forearms and legs (AZ; 44 years old at the 
time of testing; see Fig. 1) led us to suggest that the visual observation of limb 
movements could be an important factor in the genesis of congenital phantoms (Brugger 
et al. 2000). AZ reports that she has been aware of a complete body for as long as she can 
remember. Specifically, she provided vividness ratings of different body parts that 
indicated greater awareness for hands and feet compared to lower arms and lower legs, 
and also seemed to reflect “right-handedness”. Not all toes were experienced, and on 
being shown pictures of hands and ask to adopt their finger postures, she could not 
imitate all postures depicted (Fig. 1). In a paradigm investigating “apparent motion of 
body parts” (Shiffrar and Freid 1990), we compared AZ’s performance with that of CL, a 
43-year-old journalist born without arms, but who had never experienced any phantom 
sensations (Funk et al. 2005). In this paradigm, what is seen is determined by what can be 
performed with one’s limbs. With hand stimuli, AZ showed the same flash rate-
dependent perception of short vs. long apparent motion trajectories as did control 
individuals with limbs, while CL perceived the short, anatomically impossible trajectories 
at all interstimulus intervals. It thus turned out that the subjective feeling of having arms 
and hands was more decisive for the performance in this task than was the physical 
development of these body parts. More recent research with two aplasic individuals 
explicitly investigated the reorganization of the human mirror system in the absence of 
hands (Gazzola et al. 2007). In an fMRI experiment, these subjects and normally limbed 
control subjects observed a series of hand actions. Compared to a static observation 
condition, hand movement observation activated major components of the fronto-parieto-
temporal mirror system also in the amelic participants. However, there was a matching of 
visual observation and action goals rather than effector-specific execution; that is, visual 
observation of hand movements led to robust activations of cortical regions involved in 
the planning and execution of mouth and foot movements. While experiments such as the 
one by Gazzola et al. (2007) are indispensable for the understanding of the plasticity of 
the mirror system, they do not tell us about the genesis of congenital phantoms (the 
authors do not report whether or not their two amelic participants reported phantom 
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sensations). What is of key interest is a potentially differential reorganization pattern for 
those (few) amelic persons with phantom experiences compared to those without. This 
holds not only for the mirror system in particular, but also for any reorganizational 
process, whether structural (e.g. Funk et al. 2008; Gowers 1878; Nordmann and 
Lindemann 1940; Stoeckel et al. 2005) or functional (e.g. Cruz et al. 2003; Hamzei et al. 
2001), and notably also for cases with an acquired loss of a limb (Giummarra et al. 2007). 
 
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs: a concluding note 
The first part of this review dealt with an aspect of body integrity, which may be 
exceptional, but is not pathological per se. While the physical deficit itself, the absence or 
deformation of one or several limbs, clearly does reflect a pathological development, the 
“sensation of integrations” (Valentin 1836) experienced by those reporting congenital 
phantoms are “as if” experiences, clearly without any delusional coloring. The case of 
congenital phantoms is highly illustrative from a philosophy-of-science perspective. The 
nonrecognition of the phenomenon as a “scientific fact” (Fleck 1935/1979; see Brugger 
and Funk 2006, for discussion) is still ongoing and in stark contrast to the considerable 
though scattered literature documenting it existence. 
In the second part of our review, we discuss a phenomenon that shares as many 
similarities with the sensation of physically not developed limbs as it shows differences. 
It is the desire, by non-psychotic individuals, to have a fully functional, physically 
normally developed limb amputated.  
 
 
Incarnation without animation: the desire for healthy limb amputation ("body 
integrity identity disorder", BIID) 
Towards the end of the 18th century, a French surgeon was contacted by an Englishman, 
who asked that one of his legs be removed. The surgeon first refused to comply, but was 
soon forced to proceed at gunpoint: “…against his will, the surgeon separated the leg 
from the body, which had fitted perfectly, but had been proscribed by a very particular 
fantasy” (Sue 1785, p 222). Ironically, the Englishman had himself fitted for a prosthesis, 
returned to England and sent the surgeon 250 guineas by mail. The accompanying letter 
contained words of thanks for having removed “a limb which put an invincible obstacle 
to my happiness” (p 223). 
 
By reporting this anecdote (see also Johnston and Elliott 2002), we want to argue against 
the view that the desire for healthy limb amputation would constitute “a new way to be 
mad” (Baubet et al. 2007; Elliott 2000) or an internet-propagated bizarreness. In fact, 
educated discussions concerning the preoccupation with amputation of one or more of 
one’s limbs have been around for more than one hundred years. They first surfaced in the 
early literature on fetishism and sexual paraphilias (von Krafft-Ebing 1886/1965). The 
emphasis was thus on the erotic component of the desire, present in disorders like 
“apotemnophilia”, that is, the primarily sexually motivated wish to become an amputee 
(Money et al. 1977) or “acrotomophilia”, i.e. the sexual preference for amputee partners 
(Money and Simcoe 1984/86; see Bruno 1997, for a taxonomy of what he called 
“factitious disability disorder”). Despite the view that an erotic or sexual component may 
always be part of the desire for amputation (Elliott 2000; First 2005), our own work with 
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affected persons (Blanke et al. in press; unpublished observations) indicates that there is a 
“pure form” of amputation desire, not less intense and longstanding, but relatively 
uncontaminated by aspects related to sexual identity. Individuals presenting with this 
pure form typically state that they feel “overcomplete” with four limbs, that the image of 
themselves does not find a reflection in the body they feel trapped in, or simply that the 
limb they do not identify with is felt as a nuisance or an annoying appendage to their 
body. Very typically, there is a clear and stable demarcation line between “accepted” and 
“rejected” areas of a limb. 
 
First (2005) provided the first large-scale study on “an unusual dysfunction in the 
development of one’s fundamental sense of anatomical (body) identity” (p.919) and for 
which he proposed the term “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID). Telephone 
interviews with 52 affected persons without a history of mania, delusions or 
hallucinations revealed the following pattern (see Table 2): more than 90% were men; 
age of onset was “overwhelmingly during childhood or early adolescence” (p 924); the 
amputation desire concerned major limbs rather than single fingers or toes; those 
individuals desiring a single leg amputation outnumbered those wanting an arm 
amputation (38 vs. 7 individuals, all bilateral amputation desires concerned legs); left-
sided limbs were more often affected (55%) than right-sided limbs (27%); individuals 
were not psychotic and their desire differed from the psychotically motivated urge to 
perform self-mutilations; co-morbid psychopathology was unremarkable, mainly 
consisting of mild symptoms of anxiety or depression. In a recent study, we have 
confirmed the general pattern of these findings (Blanke et al. in press) and proposed an 
interpretation in neurological terms.  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
The neurological basis of BIID 
Specifically, we have suggested that BIID reflects a disturbed integration of multisensory 
limb information into a coherent cerebral representation of one’s own body as a whole 
(Blanke et al., in press). A phenomenologically similar disturbance in neuropsychiatric 
patients is asomatognosia (Arzy et al. 2006; Dieguez et al. 2007), the feeling that a body 
part is absent or has disappeared from corporeal awareness. Also related may be 
somatoparaphrenia (Bottini et al. 2002; Gerstmann 1942), the experience of a 
disownership of body parts contralateral to a unilateral lesion, mostly of the right 
hemisphere (Vallar and Ronchi 2009, for a recent overview). Still another condition 
which at least superficially resembles BIID is misoplegia, defined as the hatred of 
paralyzed limbs that involves cursing at and physical aggression towards a limb 
(Critchley 1974). We have shown that misoplegia is by no means confined to the 
presence of a paresis (Loetscher et al. 2006), but as a rule the targets of self-aggression 
are left-sided body parts (Brugger 2007). Other authors have linked Cotard delusion, 
which is the conviction that one is dead and one’s body has rotted (Berrios and Luque 
1995), to the integrity disorder underlying the desire for amputation (Carruthers 2007; 
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2008). The qualitative similarities between BIID and these neurological disorders of 
corporeal awareness suggest that the parietal lobes, especially the multisensory 
integration areas of the right superior parietal lobule, may be involved. Specifically, we 
postulated a “disturbed integration of multisensory information of the affected body parts 
into a coherent cerebral representation of one’s own body” (Blanke et al. in press) as 
triggering the amputation desire. The affected limb may be entirely functional, yet lack 
the sort of animation (“Beseelung”, in German) we usually feel to be an intrinsic property 
of any part of our own body.  
 
Recently, this de-animated state of a limb, whose amputation is desired, was 
demonstrated experimentally. McGeoch et al. (2009) used magnetoencephalography 
while three individuals with a desire for unilateral leg amputation were touched on the 
left and the right foot. While in control subjects touch elicited a reliable response in the 
right superior parietal lobule, irrespective of the body side stimulated, in the three 
persons with BIID the same region was activated upon touch of the normally integrated 
foot, but it remained silent upon touch of the critical, “unwanted” foot. In one additional 
participant, who wanted to have both legs amputated, tactile stimulation to neither foot 
was accompanied by above-threshold right parietal activation. We note that these 
observations have not yet been subject to the regular peer review process, and further 
substantiation of these findings seems therefore advisable. Other empirical evidence for a 
neurological basis of amputation desire comes from the same research group. Brang et al. 
(2008) applied pinprick stimulation both proximal and distal to the demarcation line on 
the legs of two persons suffering from BIID. In both cases, distal stimuli elicited an 
increased electrodermal response compared to proximal stimuli (and to pinpricks of the 
accepted leg in the subject who wanted a unilateral amputation). No comparable 
differences between analogous locations were found in control subjects. The magnitude 
of the electrodermal response is a reliable indicator of sympathetic arousal and is under 
control of right anterior and limbic circuits (Critchley 2002). Brang et al. (2008) thus 
interpreted the observed increase in the electrodermal response as the consequence of a 
dysfunctional superior parietal lobule, which had never learned to integrate (normally 
received) somatosensory signals from the periphery into a higher-order body 
representation. A further potential link between BIID and parietal lobe function was 
pointed out by Ramachandran and McGeoch (2007a), who speculated that caloric 
vestibular stimulation (specifically left-ear cold water irrigation) could be used to treat 
BIID by activation of right parietal projection areas of the vestibular system. In fact, 
somatoparaphrenic delusions can be temporarily abolished by this procedure (Bisiach et 
al. 1991), but vestibular stimulation is very unlikely to ever “heal” BIID, as it is well 
known that its effects on bodily awareness vanish as soon as the nystagmoid response has 
ceased.  
 
BIID and related identity disorders and conditions of self-directed aggression 
The metaphor of “the wrong body”, before being used in connection with BIID, was 
created to illustrate the suffering of people with gender identity disorder (GID). Both GID 
and BIID are characterized by a profound discontent with actual embodiment; in both, the 
desire arises to surgically change the current body state. Simulation of the desired identity 
state occurs in BIID (“pretending” behavior; Bruno 1997) and GID (“crossdressing”; 
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Schrock and Reid 2006), and there may be a sexual attraction to persons with the target 
embodiment (the apotemnophilia component in the case of BIID). For a comprehensive 
review of these and other commonalities see Lawrence (2006).While neuroscientists’ 
relative neglect of issues relating to sexuality has been lamented (Herbert 2008), the few 
focal attempts to elucidate the brain bases of gender identity deserve to be laudably 
mentioned, especially as they are highly relevant for the neurological understanding of 
BIID as well. Ramachandran and McGeoch (2007b; 2008) set out to determine the 
incidence of phantom penis sensations in male-to-female transsexuals after sex 
reassignment surgery. They found it to be roughly 30% (6/20), i.e. only about half the 
figure of 58% reported in the literature on post penectomy phantoms in men without 
GID. Even more surprising were the findings of a similar survey conducted in female-to-
male transsexuals before the desired operation. Eighteen of the 29 persons questioned 
reported phantom penis experiences (while none of 10 control women did). Together, 
these observations form strong support for the view that “female-to-male transsexuals do 
(at least in some respects) possess a man’s brain in a woman’s body and that the converse 
is true for male-to-female transsexuals” (Ramachandran and McGeoch 2008, p 14). They 
also support our notion of BIID as an “incarnation without animation”, or a negative 
phantom limb experience.  
Among the conditions not usually regarded as an identity disorder is “compulsive 
targeted self-injurious behaviour” (SIB), mostly described in people suffering from 
neuropathic pain (Mailis 1996). As in BIID, specific, circumscribed target areas on the 
body are identified by those committing SIB (as compared to general, nondirected forms 
of self-mutilation). Viewed as the human equivalent of animal autotomy (Mailis 1996), 
the disorder postulates a lack of mental representation of the body part against which 
physical self-aggression is directed (Lewis et al. 2007). The use of the term “autotomy” 
in these contexts was criticized by Wilkie et al. (2007), because in zoology it has already 
a precise and delimited meaning (i.e. self-detachment of a limb), and unlike self-
mutilation, the phenomenon is adaptive. Nevertheless, conceived of as “mental 
autotomy” (Brugger 2007; Bilikiewicz 1969 used the term “autotomia imaginaria”), the 
desire of amputation receives a broader conceptualization, extending it to the field of 
general vertebrate behavior. A comprehensive listing of the desire (and realization) of 
body modifications less incisive than limb amputation can be found in the monograph by 
Kasten (2006). 
 
Observations not readily compatible with BIID as a deficit in limb representation 
Although we have ourselves propagated dysfunction of the right parietal lobe as 
implicated in the genesis of BIID (Brugger 2007; Blanke et al. in press), and others have 
provided textbook like empirical illustrations of such a dysfunction (McGeoch et al. 
2009), we would like to add a word of caution as to the general validity of the “parietal 
cortex theory” of BIID. Several observations are at variance even with a moderate 
version of this theory, acknowledging that widely distributed networks between the 
parietal lobes and other cortical and subcortical structures are involved. The first is the 
documentation of a change in the desire such as the exceptional shift from wanting a left 
leg removed to desiring removal of the right. (Kasten 2009; Kasten and Stirn 2009). 
Another observation not readily compatible with the traditional neurological account of 
BIID concerns those (minority) cases of the disorder, in which amputation of a target 
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limb does not bring about the desired relief, and a new amputation desire suddenly 
develops for a previously well-integrated limb (e.g. Berger et al. 2005). The case 
communicated by Sorene et al. (2006) is exemplary in this respect (Fig. 2); a 51-year-old 
non-psychotic civil servant was seen by the authors after having cut his left forearm with 
an axe. The compulsive desire to have this body part removed newly emerged after 
several other forced or self-conducted amputations of other limbs, starting with the 
amputation of the right leg 10 years before. Although rather atypical, this case illustrates 
that there is still a need for a unifying theory of BIID, which accounts for the broad 
variability in individual symptoms. We note, however, that in defense of the theory of a 
defective parietal lobe, it is still possible that a (sub)cortical dysregulation of corporeal 
awareness could be the cause of an amputation desire for different body parts at different 
times. For instance, it is known that the right parietal lobe is generally dominant for the 
attribution of a proper “sense of self” to single body parts, whether left-sided or right-
sided (Tsakiris et al. 2008). Thus, amputation at one body site might bring about a 
transient relief of the desire for amputation, but qualmish feelings about one’s body 
integrity may later reoccur, and target a body part at a different site and even side.1    
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
On the other hand, observations like the one reported by Sorene et al. (2006) are also 
compatible with the view that BIID reflects a general desire for reaching a disabled state 
(Baubet et al. 2007; Kasten 2009), and that limb specificity is rather secondary. In line 
with this view are reports about variants of BIID in which the amputation of a limb would 
be abhorred, but a state of sensory loss is desired instead (desire for paraplegia; Kasten 
2009; desire for deafness: Veale 2006).  
Finally, the fact that persons with BIID, who succeeded in realizing the desired 
amputation, do report phantom limbs (Kasten, 2006, p.165; own unpublished 
observation) seems to speak against a life-long lack of animation of the lost limb. 
However, it would be unwise to assume that decades of limb use would not have left 
traces in the brain. Clearly, more research is needed to assess the vividness and 
persistence of phantom sensations after desired compared to undesired amputation. A 
first hint in favour of the view of BIID as a “negative phantom” phenomenon is found in 
the dream reports of persons having had the desired amputation. Compared with 
published figures for traumatic amputees (reviewed in Brugger 2008), the time until an 
individual dreams of being amputated is much shorter after a desired amputation 
(unpublished observations).  
 
BIID: a concluding note 
BIID poses fundamental problems to medicine, psychology, ethics and the law. From a 
medical perspective, there is no consensus on what causes the desire for amputation. 
Currently, BIID is not listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 
(DSM-IV-TR), and its prevalence, diagnostic classification and potential treatments are 
unknown or controversial. There is a remarkable upsurge of ethical discussions about 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility. 
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how to cope with the amputation requests of a rapidly growing community of people 
avowing themselves to BIID. While the ethical aspects of GID are relatively clear, those 
concerning BIID are a matter of fervent debate (Müller 2008 and associated open peer 
commentary). With regard to the many open questions surrounding BIID, Johnston and 
Elliot (2002, p 435) concluded: “We believe that the proper response to people who wish 
to have healthy limbs amputated will not become clear until much more is known about 
the nature of the condition itself.” We hope that the present review will sensitize 
clinicians and researchers to recognize a phenomenon, whose understanding may not 
only lead to novel insights about how the brain mediates the experience of an embodied 
self, but whose investigation will necessarily help in bridging the many gaps that still 
exist between neurology and psychiatry. 
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Table Captions and Figure Legends 
 
Table 1: 
Published reports on phantom sensations of congenitally absent or deformed limbs. Not 
included are cases of phantom limbs that first occurred after major stump surgery, after 
amputations in very early childhood, or exclusively in night dreams. 
(Adopted from Brugger and Funk 2006 and Price, 2006) 
 
Table 2: 
Similarities and differences between the condition of congenital phantoms and the desire 
for amputation. Selected key references document the respective points of similarity 
explicitly.  
 
 
Figure 1: 
One way to diminish the chances that one is duped by a dysmelic individual’s claims 
about phantom limbs, is to ask about postural details, which can hardly be faked without 
expert knowledge. Top: subject AZ (born without lower arms; left panel) reported that 
she occasionally folded her phantom arms “as normal people do”. Folding them on 
command, she indicated that the left was on top of the right (middle panel). On being 
asked to fold her phantom arms “the other way round” (i.e. to put the right on top of the 
left; right panel) she immediately showed an expression of discomfort and commented 
that this posture “feels extremely awkward”. Bottom: shown drawings of hands with the 
request to mimic the depicted finger posture and to indicate the vividness of the resulting 
phantom sensation (on a 7-point scale), AZ’ vividness ratings matched those of normal 
controls, who had to imagine taking the shown postures. Specifically, item 4 received a 
very low rating (note the anatomical impossibility of a fully stretched ring finger!).  
 
 
Figure 2: 
Even if atypical, this case of a man in his early fifties illustrates that theories of BIID 
unilaterally focusing on a failed integration of a particular limb cannot account for all 
clinical shades of the disorder. After having forced an amputation of the right leg, 
satisfying the initial desire for amputation, a new desire arose, this time targeting the right 
little finger. Later the desire for amputation spread to the little finger and then to the ring 
finger of the left hand, and ultimately to the whole forearm. 
After Sorene et al. (2006), Fig. 2; reprinted with permission. 
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TABLE 1: 
 
 
References:   nb. of congenital phantoms cumulative nr. of cases with 
per nb. of persons examined congenital phantom limbs 
             
 
Valentin 1836; Sohn 1914;  
Mikorey 1952; Poeck 1964;    1/1 each      7 
Ramachandran 1993; Grouios 
1996; Brugger et al. 2000 
 
Burchard 1965     1/17       8 
 
Boonstra et al. 2000     1/26       9 
 
Kooijman et al. 2000     1/27     10 
 
Simmel 1961      2/27     12 
 
Xue 1986      2/2     14 
 
Wilkins et al. 1998     2/17     16 
 
Valentin 1836      4/4     20 
 
Saadah & Melzack 1994    7/75     27 
 
Weinstein & Sersen 1961    5/30     32 
 
Weinstein et al. 1964   13/71     45 
 
Melzack et al. 1997   15/76     60* 
 
__________________ 
* average incidence (the 7 single case reports excluded) = 16.1% 
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TABLE 2: 
 
 
        phantom sensations of desire for amputation 
    congenitally absent limbs (BIID) 
             
COMMONALITIES: 
 
May be underreported (reluctance    Abramson and Feibel Fisher and Smith 2000;  
to mention the condition)     1981; Scatena 1990  Braam et al. 2006 
 
First manifestation early in life    Melzack et al. 1997  First 2005 
 
Bias in favour of left-sided limbs*    Price 2006   Brugger 2007 
 
Visual triggering of sensation/    Frank 1986;   Blanke et al. in press; 
desire reported      Melzack et al. 1997  Kasten 2009   
 
Cortical correlates of condition    Brugger et al. 2000  Brang et al. 2008;  
demonstrated   McGeoch et al. 2009 
 
No unifying theory formulated              Brugger and Funk 2006;  Kasten 2009;  
        Price 2006   Müller 2008 
 
 
MAJOR DIFFERENCES: 
 
Gender bias       absent   more frequent in men 
 
Upper vs. lower extremities     more frequent for arms more frequent for legs 
 
Suffering       absent   present 
 
Sexual component      absent   may be present 
 
Obsessive-compulsive component    absent   often present 
 
Stability of affected limb     stable   may shift 
 
__________________ 
* for phantom sensations a consequence of a higher incidence of left-sided dysmelia in 
general, at least for upper limbs (e.g. Simmel 1961, footnote 6) 
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